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ABSTRACT 
Do people value commodities more when they own the commodities than when they do not? 
Although economic models generally presume that economic agents evaluate commodities 
independently of whether the agents own those commodities or not, an assumption that we term the 
"basic independence" assumption, researchers in economics and law are starting to doubt that this is 
true. These doubts about the soundness of the basic independence assumption challenge accepted 
economic doctrine. Most theoretical and applied models in economics use the basic independence 
assumption both to predict and assess the operation of markets. And in the relatively new 
discipline of law and economics, the basic independence assumption produces the Coase Theorem, 
which is the starting point for much economic analysis of legal rules. 
In this paper we present, organize, and critique the modern evidence on the basic 
independence assumption so as to draw together the learning of the economists and the lawyers. 
We will first investigate the evidence on the divergence between willingness-to-accept and 
willingness-to-pay measures of value, and then ask about possible explanations for the evidence. 
Next, we will explore the implications of the divergence for analysis in law and economics. Last, 
we will show that although the divergence between willingness-to-accept and willingness-to-pay 
measures of value may entail substantially limiting the role of cost-benefit analysis, we cannot 
precisely map those limits without answering some difficult questions about the source of the 
disparity between willingness-to-accept and willingness-to-pay. 
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PROLOGUE 
In 1 975, I (Matthew Spitzer) attended Professor Robert Ellickson's class on Real Estate 
Transactions at the University of Southern California Law Center. Early in the semester Professor 
Ellickson turned to the class and asked us all the following question. "For how little would you be 
willing to sell your casebook from first year Torts class? Not just any copy of that text, but the 
one in which you put your own marginal notes and underlining." He elicited the answers from us. 
Then Professor Ellickson asked, "Now, assume that you lost your book, that it was turned into the 
lost and found, and that the applicable rules about finders would give undisputed title to the book 
to the lost and found. How much would you be willing to pay to get back your old casebook from 
first year Torts?" Professor Ellickson collected the answers and compared them. Noticing that 
most of the students claimed to demand much more to sell their old Torts casebooks than they 
would be willing to pay to get the same books back, he frowned and shook his head from side to 
side. "This can't be right," he said. "These answers are supposed to be the same. Some of you must 
not be telling the truth." But my classmates protested that they had answered honestly. Professor 
Ellickson considered the possibility for a moment and then asked, "But if you would pay no more 
than $1 or $2 to buy back your Torts casebook, why wouldn't you sell it for less than $5 or $10?" 
My classmates were stymied, managing only to convey the sense that the two situations seemed 
quite different. I, on the other hand, who had finished the first year introductory sequence of 
-------igra4uaUl-courses in eeenemies, had a pat answei. "Wealth effects" I shouted I rom the back of the 
room. Again Professor Ellickson frowned and shook his head. "Wealth effects are probably too 
small to to produce this sort of result. There has to be something else going on." I thought for a 
moment, decided that if my classmates had well-behaved, twice differentiable utility functions 
Professor Ellickson was probably right, and resolved to follow Samuel Clemens' advice about 
keeping your mouth shut and letting people think you a fool--at least for the remainder of the 
class hour. Professor Ellickson shrugged and went on with his lesson plan. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Do people value commodities more when they own the commodities than when they do not? 
Although economic models generally presume that economic agents evaluate commodities 
independently of whether the agents own those commodities or not, an assumption that we term 
"basic independence" assumption, researchers in economics and law are starting to doubt that this is 
true. These doubts about the soundness of the basic independence assumption, challenge accepted 
economic doctrine. Most theoretical and applied models in economics use the basic independence 
assumption both to predict and to assess the operation of markets. And in the relatively new 
discipline of law and economics, the basic independence assumption produces the Coase Theorem, 1 
which is the starting point for much economic analysis of legal rules. 
To better understand the importance of the basic independence assumption, consider the 
following example. A homeowner lives next to a smelter. The smelter's operations emit smoke that 
smells bad and interferes with the homeowner's view of the mountains. Under these circumstances 
the law might give the homeowner a legal right to clean air and require the smelter to buy the 
homeowner's permission to emit smoke. Alternatively, the law might give the smelter the right to 
emit smoke, in effect requiring the homeowner to buy the right to clean air from the smeltJ:J�-------
If valuation is not affected by the distribution of ownership (and a number of other 
assumptions hold), then to predict how much smoke will ultimately be emitted by the smelter, one 
need only ascertain each side's willingness to pay for air at different quality levels. If the 
homeowner is willing to pay a great deal for relatively clean air and the smelter is not willing to 
pay very much to produce smoke, then not much smoke will be emitted, regardless of which side 
has the legal right to the air. If the law assigns the right to the smelter, the homeowner will 
purchase a large reduction in smoke from the smelter. If the law assigns the right to the 
homeowner, the smelter will not purchase rights to emit very much smoke. In fact, the prediction is 
that exactly the same amount of smoke will be emitted, regardless of which side is initially assigned 
the rights to the air. 2 
The prediction that the final distribution of rights is independent of the initial assignment of 
rights is known as the Coase Theorem, and serves as the basis for many normative arguments. 
Some claim that the operation of this perfect market should serve as a normative benchmark -­
when one side values the right more than the other side at every level of quality the common law 
should assign property rights to those who would end up with them. If values do not change based 
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upon who starts with the right, this normative prescription closely tracks the Kaldor-Hicks 
compensation criterion.3 Others claim that regardless of whether we should embrace the Kaldor­
Hicks compensation criterion, we should award rights to those who value them the most so as to 
save the transactions costs of rearranging the rights.4 Still others suggest that we should use
damage rules, rather than property rules, where the parties would find it costly to rearrange the 
rights.5 Moreover, the damages rules themselves probably incorporate the basic independence
assumption, for the analysis of damages rules usually defines damages independently of who owns 
the rights. 6 These arguments are lengthy and complex, and provide the focus of some of the most 
spirited debates in law and economics.7
But if the basic independence assumption fails, all of this may change. Consider the 
following variation of our example involving a homeowner and a smelter. If the law assigns clean 
air rights to the homeowner, he will not allow the smelter to degrade the air unless the smelter pays 
enough money to the homeowner. Call the minimum amount the homeowner would accept in 
exchange for his right to a given level of air quality "WT A," for "willingness to accept." If the law 
assigns the right to clean air to the smelter, on the other hand, the homeowner will pay no more for 
a given improvement in  air quality than the improvement is worth to him. Call the maximum 
amount he would pay for the right to a given improvement in air quality, "WTP ," for "willingness 
to pay." Also, call the amount the smelter would be willing to pay for a given reduction in air 
quality, "S," which is exactly the same amount the smelter would accept to refrain from reducing 
air quality to that extent. (In other words, WTA=WTP for the smelter.) 
If WTA>S>WTP for a given change in air quality, the homeowner will refuse to sell if he 
already owns the right to clean air. But, if the smelter owns the right to dirty the air the 
homeowner will refuse to buy. In the limit, if WTA>S> WTP at every air quality level, then the 
homeowner will neither sell any rights to the smelter (if the homeowner owns the rights), nor buy 
any rights to clean air (if the smelter owns the rights). 
If WTA>WTP, as described above, then many normative arguments may change. For 
example, even if there are no transactions costs, there is no longer a unique, well-defined outcome 
of Coasian bargaining for those who would argue that it  provides a benchmark for the Common 
Law. The Kaldor-Hicks compensation criterion (and all versions of cost-benefit analysis deriving 
therefrom) similarly lose whatever precision they might have had. They now may require a 
reference to the status quo for their definition. The subsidiary arguments about saving transactions 
costs may either gain or lose force, depending upon how one wants to regard them.8 Damages rules 
may also require reference to the status quo. 
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The basic independence assumption has been scrutinized by economists and other social 
scientists attempting to describe consumer valuation. Applied welfare economists have been 
particularly interested in refining the technology of cost-benefit analysis for deciding whether to 
undertake the provision of large-scale public goods, such as environmental improvements.9
Although these economists have paid � attention to the normative issues, their main concern has 
been the careful elucidation of the complexities and subtleties surrounding the disparity between 
WTA and WTP. In contrast, the legal scholars -- primarily Duncan Kennedy and Mark Kelman -­
have concentrated on the normative implications of presuming that WTA> WTP. Their discussions, 
however, have not taken account of the subtle and intricate evidence from economics.10  They were, 
perhaps, more concerned with undermining confidence in cost-benefit analysis, and the liberal 
vision of society under law that they claim rests (in part) upon cost-benefit analysis, than with 
evaluating the evidence they were using for their critiques. 
In this paper we present, organize, and critique the modern evidence on the question of WTA 
and WTP, so as to draw together the learning of the economists and the lawyers. We will first 
investigate the evidence on the divergence between WTA and WTP, and then examine possible 
explanations for the evidence. 11 Next, we will explore the implications of a possible divergence for 
analysis in law and economics. Last, we will show that, although the divergence between WT A and 
WTP may entail substantially limiting the role of cost-benefit analysis, we cannot precisely map 
those limits without answering some difficult questions aho_uLthe_s_Qurces of the_dispatlt_y_hatweeJL-____ _ 
WTA and WTP. 
II. EVIDENCE ON WTA AND WTP
A. Survey evidence 
There are two sources of evidence pertaining to the divergence between WT A and WTP: surveys 
and experiments. Historically, survey evidence was generated first. Economists were frequently 
given the task of estimating the costs and benefits of proposed large-scale projects, such as power 
plants. To do this, economists had to value the loss of environmental goods such as clean air and 
water. However, there were no direct markets for spectacular views of national parks, so there 
were no prices to observe. Therefore, in order to value the environmental goods, economists had to 
develop new sources of data. They began asking individuals affected by such large-scale projects 
either how much they would be willing to pay to avoid some potential environmental deterioration 
(WTP) or how much they would have to be compensated to accept the same environmental 
deterioration (WTA). 
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Economists have known for a long time that WTP and WT A might differ if those selling their 
rights were, in  some sense, wealthier than those buying them. But a very influential work by 
Robert Willig 12  argued that under most circumstances the divergence would be small, probably less 
than 5%. Economists have assumed that Willig's analysis applied in the case of environmental 
goods, and have proceeded to value environmental commodities by asking about WTP in  surveys of 
consumers.13 A typical survey might focus on a potential increase or decrease in visible air
pollution, and prepare pictures of both current air quality and how the air would look (on average) 
with increased or decreased pollution. The survey takers would show the pictures to subjects and 
ask them how much they would be willing to pay either to avoid a pictured increase or to enjoy a 
pictured decrease in air pollution. Some surveys would then give each subject a chance to change 
his answer: the surveyors might ask the subject if he would be willing to pay a bit more for the 
decrease in pollution, and keep asking the subject to pay more until he refused. The survey takers 
would then use the WTP responses as indicative of values in the target population and compute 
either the total damage from increasing pollution or the total value from reducing pollution by 
extrapolating from the survey responses. 
A few surveys, however, have asked explicitly about both WTP and WTA, and the answers have 
diverged far more than theory suggested they should. In response, economists have been skeptical, 
suggesting that there are several types of errors affecting these results Such errors include 
strategic responses, where the respondents lie to the surveyor in an effort to manipulate the 
outcome in  accord with the respondents' true preferences; information biases, where the surveyor 
(perhaps inadvertently) manipulates the responses by supplying information about the proposed 
program that is designed to elicit the responses; instrument bias, where the surveyor's questioning 
techniques mold the results; and bias produced by nonrandom sampling techniques. 14
In the last few years, some experimental economists and psychologists have begun to design 
and run experiments to test whether WTA is substantially larger than WTP. We will examine these 
experiments in some detail. They show, as a group, that there is some evidence that WTA may 
exceed WTP by a substantial amount. This seems most likely in the case of consumer items that are 
not bought and sold repeatedly. 
B .  Experimental evidence 
This section will concentrate on answering four main questions. I) Does WT A exceed WTP in 
real experimental markets? 2) Assuming that it does, is this true only for consumer goods that are 
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owned by consumers, or is this also true of rights to income flows, such as securities? 3) Does 
repeated participation in markets for rights as a buyer and seller reduce an individual's WT A/WTP 
spread? 4) By what factor does WTA exceed WTP? 
1 .  Does WT A exceed WTP in experimental markets? 
a. Coursey, Hovis and Schulze
Coursey, Hovis and Schulze devised a set of experiments to compare WTP to WTA in both 
survey and experimental market circumstances.15 First, they devised a bidding mechanism for 
leading subjects to reveal their true WTP and WTA values for holding a one-ounce cup of sucrose 
octa-acetate (SOA) -- a safe but very bitter-tasting liquid -- in their mouths for twenty seconds. 
Each subject in  these experiments was allowed to sample a drop or two of SOA at one point in the 
experiment. 
The WTP experiments proceeded, in essence, by asking each of 8 subjects to state a willingness 
to pay to avoid tasting the SOA. The four highest bidders avoided tasting the SOA. The remaining 
subjects had to taste it. But, the four high bidders had to pay the experimenter only the amount of 
the fifth highest bid. Under these circumstances, it is in the self-interest of each subject to bid his 
true willingness to pay to avoid tasting the SOA. Because the size of the subject's bid_cL"et..,.e,,_r,,m, iwn"'e,,s _____ _ 
only whether i t  will be accepted, not how much he will have to pay if it is accepted, the subject 
can gain nothing by bidding too high or too low. 
To see this, consider the costs and benefits of deception. If the subject bids more than his true 
value and wins the auction, he neither gains nor loses if his true value is actually greater than or 
equal to the fifth highest bid. However, if his true value is less than the fifth highest bid, he ends 
up paying more than he is willing to pay to avoid tasting SOA. Now consider what happens if he 
bids less than his true value and he loses the auction. If his true value is actually less than or equal 
to the fifth highest bid, he neither gains nor loses by such deception. However, if his true value is 
greater than the fifth highest bid, then he ends up tasting SOA, even though he would have been 
willing to pay the fifth highest bid price to avoid tasting it. In sum, he never gains, and he can lose 
by bidding other than his true value. Coursey, Hovis and Schulze ran these experiments several 
times with the same subjects, so the subjects had a chance to learn these properties of the bidding 
mechanism. 
The W T  A experiments were run in an identical fashion to the WTP experiments, except that 
subjects were asked to reveal their willingness to accept payment for agreement to taste the SOA, 
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and only the four low bids were accepted. The four low bidders were paid the amount of the fifth 
lowest bid. 
Coursey, Hovis and Schulze also collected survey data from their subjects regarding their 
hypothetical WT A and WTP values. They first just described SOA to the subjects before asking for 
WTA or WTP. Then they allowed each subject to sample a drop of SOA before repeating the WTA 
or WTP question. In both types of surveys, WTA averaged between $7.00 and $15.00, but WTP 
averaged only $3.00-$4.50. In contrast, in the incentive-compatible bidding experiments described 
in the paragraphs above, WT A was much greater than WTP in the first few rounds of the 
experiments; but as the subjects participated in more rounds of the experiments the WT A values 
dropped. By the last (tenth) round, WTA had dropped to an average of about $4.00. This was still 
slightly above average WTP, but was so close as to be statistically indistinguishable. The average 
WTP was the same in the hypothetical and incentive-compatible rounds. 
Coursey, Hovis and Schulze interpret their result to mean that "true" WTP does not differ from 
"true" WTA. They also claim that their results indicate that surveys asking for WTP data are likely 
to be reliable indicators of individuals' true values for goods, but that WT A survey data is likely to 
be substantially inflated. However, several alternative interpretations of their data remain. To see 
this, we must decompose their claims into four steps. They claim that 1 )  WTP and WT A converge 
bid true value); 2) the final bids in the incentive-compatible auctions represent true values; and 3) 
hypothetical WTP equals real WTP in their experimental data. These three claims then lead to claim 
4) that respondents to hypothetical surveys of WTP reveal their true WTP=WTA. We will show that
claim 1 )  may not be correct. 16 Next, we will show that the experimental results on the behavioral 
properties of second-price and fifth-price, sealed-bid auctions suggest that claim 2) may not be 
correct. Claim 3) emerges from their data. However, claim 4) is not supported, since it rests on 
claims 1 )-3) all being correct. Thus, we cannot assume on the basis of Coursey, Hovis, and 
Schulze's results that responses to hypothetical WTP surveys represent true WTP=WT A. 
Claim ll: Because WTA did stay slightly above WTP, true WTA may exceed WTP by a small 
amount. Gregory and Furby 17 reanalyzed the data by excluding wildly aberrant responses before 
applying any statistical tests. They conclude that WTA exceeded WTP by a statistically significant 
amount (about $ 1 .00), even on the final round of the auction. 
Claim 2: Perhaps the iterative experiments failed to prompt subjects to reveal their true 
valuations. Gregory and Furby suggest that it is very difficult for most people to understand why 
the auction should lead them to reveal their true values. 18 If subjects do not understand that it is 
IO  
; 
in their best interests to reveal true values, the bids might represent strategic bids in  a (futile) 
effort to manipulate the auction. The convergence of WT A to WTP would then best be regarded as 
a convergence of strategies, rather than a convergence of true values. 
This last criticism is supported by a careful re-analysis of the evidence linking bids in an 
incentive-compatible auction and true values. Coursey, Hovis, and Schulze 19 cite Cox, Roberson,
and Smith20 and Coursey and Smith21 in support of their contention that responses in  the
incentive-compatible auctions represent true values. 
Cox, Roberson, and Smith studied the behavioral properties of second-price, sealed-bid 
auctions, in which each bidder submits a sealed bid to purchase a coupon, redeemable at a given 
price. In this auction the highest bidder wins the auction and pays only the second-highest bid 
price. In each auction each subject was given a redemption value, which specified the amount to 
be earned if he or she won that auction. Each subject received a different redemption value and 
redemption values were randomly reassigned for the next auction in a series of auctions with the 
same subjects. This feature gave each subject a chance to be an auction winner at least once over a 
series of auctions. Like the fifth-price auction discussed above, the second-price, sealed bid 
auction should lead subjects to bid their true values because the winner of the auction pays the 
second-highest bid price. However, Cox, Roberson and Smith found that bidders in these 
experimental auctions did not tend to behave as predicted at first. In particular, they tended to bid 
less than their true values. But, over time, most participants learned to bid their true values. Thus, 
Cox, Roberson, and Smith's results provide evidence that participants in an incentive-compatible 
auction can learn over time to bid their true values. 
Unfortunately, the Cox, Roberson, and Smith results have not been replicated consistently. 
Cox and Smith, themselves, and others22 found that many high-valuation subjects actually bid
more than their true values in these auctions. Moreover, many low-valuation subjects bid less. 
In addition, Coursey and Smith23 and Cox, Smith and Walker24 tested the behavioral
properties of a fifth-price auction very similar to the fifth-price auction used in Coursey, Hovis, 
and Schulze25. Coursey and Smith26 and Cox, Smith, and Walker27 assigned redemption values to 
subjects, as in Cox, Roberson, and Smith28, and then conducted a series of fifth-price, sealed-bid
auctions for four units to be sold to the four highest bidders at the fifth-highest bid price. They 
found that some high-valuation participants bid more than their true values, while many others bid 
1 1
less. Low-valuation participants generally bid less than their true values. The average bid price was 
significantly below the average redemption value for the four highest valuation participants. 29 
Thus, subjects tend to both overbid and underbid in both second-price and fifth-price, 
sealed-bid auctions, even though both auctions should theoretically induce subjects to bid their 
true values. These findings suggest that we cannot accept the revelations of value in  the fifth-price 
auction for SOA as representing true value. 
Many of the experimental works that we review below use some version of the fifth (or 
second, or "nth") price auction to derive values from subjects. To the extent that the responses are 
not trustworthy, many of the experiments may be suspect. When we discuss the experimental 
results we will not repeat this criticism at each point. However, the reader should keep in mind 
that this critique could apply to any of the experiments utilizing these theoretically demand­
revealing mechanisms. 
Summary of Critique of Coursey. Hovis and Schulze: Coursey, Hovis and Schulze ask us to 
believe that responses to hypothetical WTP surveys represent true WTP=WTA. They claim that I )  
WTP and WT A converge to the same value in  the incentive-compatible auctions; 2) the final bids in 
the incentive-compatible auctions represent true values; and 3) hypothetical WTP equals real WTP 
in their experimental data These th-tee-elaims then lead to claim 4) that respondents to hypothetical 
surveys of WTP reveal their true WTP=WTA. We have already seen that claim I )  may not be 
correct.30 The experimental results on the behavioral properties of second-price and fifth-price,
sealed-bid auctions suggest that claim 2) may not be correct. Claim 3) emerges from their data. 
However, claim 4) is not supported, since it  rests on claims 1 )-3) all being correct. Thus, we cannot 
assume at this time that responses to hypothetical WTP surveys represent true WTP=WT A. 
b. Boyce,�
Boyce, et. ai.31 investigated whether WTA might exceed WTP for an irreversible choice about
preserving animal or plant species, or of environmental amenities. Such preservation value is 
referred to as existence value or option value in the environmental economics literature.32
To identify existence value and test for any difference between WTA and WTP, Boyce, et. al. 
used a houseplant which looks and grows like a pine tree (a Norfolk Island pine). Because of 
previous criticism of the behavioral properties of fifth-price auc tions, the authors decided to use a 
different incentive-compatible mechanism--- termed "BDM"---for eliciting WTP and WTA 
values.33
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Boyce, et. al., obtain WTP and WT A values in two types of experiments: kill and no kill. In 
the kill experiments subjects are told that any trees not sold or kept are to be killed at the end of 
the experiment. To manitain credibility without inflicting undue psychic pain, one subject, chosen 
randomly by a bingo ball draw, witnesses the tree killing and then reports to the others that the 
trees have been destroyed. In the no kill version of the WTP and WT A experiments, subjects are 
given no information about the tress' prospects for happiness, and any remaining trees are recycled 
for future use. Boyce, et. al., also obtain WTA and WTP values, in both kill and no kill versions, in 
hypothetical trial questionnaires.34 
The complete experimental design is illustrated in Figure I .  Each subject in the laboratory 
experiment participated in both a hypothetical survey and a real auction, using the BDM method 
for valuation. For the hypothetical survey and the real auction, each subject participated in one of 
four experimental treatments: WTP /kill, WTP /no kill, WT A/kill, WT A/no kill. In addition, another 
group of participants was administered either a WTP /kill or a WT A/kill survey outside the 
laboratory. 
[Table I about here] 
Boyce, et. aI.35 find that WT A is slightly higher than WTP in the no kill experimental 
auctions. Mean WT A is $8.00 and mean WTP is $4.8 1 .  In the kill experiments, on the other hand, 
the difference is substantially larger. Moreover, WTP kill is greater than WTP no kill and WTA kill 
is greater than WTA no kill. Mean WTA kill is $ 1 8.43 and mean WTP kill is $7.8 1 .36
Comparing hypothetical responses and auction bids, Boyce, � find substantial differences 
between the laboratory and the field. In the laboratory, the hypothetical responses are significantly 
higher than the auction bids in both the WTP and the WTA experiments. Numerous subjects in the 
WTA kill treatment indicate they would not sell their plants at any price. The researchers code all 
such responses as WTA>$50.00. Few participants in the WTA auctions actually bid more than 
$50.00. The mean response in the WTP/kill laboratory survey is $16.80, more than twice the mean 
response in the WTP /kill auction. Yet, the hypothetical response in the WTP /kill field survey is 
actually slightly less than the mean bid in the WTP /kill purchase auction. The difference is not 
statistically significant. In contrast to the WTP responses, the WT A/kill field survey responses are 
more similar to the WT A/kill laboratory survey responses than to the WT A/kill auction results. 
Boyce, � interpret their results as indicating that WTA>WTP, especially when 
preservation of the plant is at stake (existence value, in their interpretation). Moreover, both WTP 
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and WT A are higher in the presence of existence value. Finally, field surveys of WTP conform to 
bids in an incentive-compatible auction, suggesting to the researchers that field surveys of WTP 
may be reliable indicators of true willingness-to-pay. 
While we cannot yet evaluate these results in the depth we have evaluated the Coursey, Hovis, 
and Schulze37 results, they are suggestive of a real difference between WTP and WT A. The BDM
mechanism has not yet received independent testing; although Schulze and other coauthors have 
presented some preliminary work suggesting it performs significantly better than the fifth-price 
auction.38 This approach to elicitation of value requires further study. Should the BDM mechanism
survive further scrutiny, we could conclude on the basis of Boyce, et. al.'s results that WTA>WTP 
in the context of this experiment. 
c. Other Experimental Work
Knetsch, Thaler, and Kahneman also tested whether WTA>WTP in both experimental markets 
and in survey data.39 Their experimental markets started by distributing a small consumer item -­
in some experiments Cornell coffee mugs and in other experiments boxed ball point pens with 
price tags indicating that the pens could be purchased at the Cornell University student store for 
$3 98 -- to one half of an assembled group After everyone h��as------­
each person was asked a series of questions. Those who had received the mugs or pens were asked 
if they would agree to part with the mugs or pens at various prices. Those who did not get a 
consumer good were asked if they would agree to buy the good at various prices. Subjects were 
told that the actual price would be selected later. The subjects participated in four identical 
markets in a row, and were told beforehand that one of the markets would be selected at random. 
Their answers for the selected market would determine whether or not they would buy (or sell) a 
consumer good at the price selected in the market. 
Knetsch, Thaler, and Kahneman argue that, under these circumstances, subjects have very 
little incentive to misrepresent their preferences. That is because, just as in the Coursey, Hovis and 
Schulze experiments, statements of WTP or WT A determined whether or not a bid or offer would 
be accepted, but not the price. The price was determined by the market. With many subjects in an 
experiment, as Knetsch, Thaler, and Kahneman had, no individual subject could reasonably think 
that changing his own bid would likely affect the market price.40
Knetsch, Thaler, and Kahneman then go on to argue that if subjects reveal their true WTA and 
WTP, and if WTA=WTP, one can expect, on average, about half of the consumer goods will trade 
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hands in each experiment. On the other hand, if WTA>WTP, significantly fewer than half of the 
goods will trade. They found that only about one sixth of the consumer goods traded, rather than 
the one half predicted by the WTA=WTP hypothesis. In addition, the buyers' median WTP tended 
to be less than half of the sellers' median WTA.41
Knetsch, Thaler, and Kahneman ran another set of mug experiments, in which they divided 
subjects into buyers, sellers, and choosers. The buyers were asked to name buying prices (maximum 
WTP) and the sellers were asked to name selling prices (minimum WT A), as in the first experiment. 
Choosers were asked choose between a mug and cash at each possible price. The relative prices 
named by the buyers and sellers were indistinguishable from those in the previous experiment. 
Mean selling prices were significantly higher than mean buying prices. However, the mean price 
for choosers was the same as the mean price for buyers, suggesting a real divergence between WTA 
and WTP, independent of any wealth effects. 
Knetsch, Thaler, and Kahneman also ran a set of Coasian bargaining experiments designed to 
test whether WTA exceeds WTP in a two person bargaining setting. Fifty-two subjects were paired 
off. One person in each pair was given a coffee mug and was told that he or she could either keep 
it and take it home or sell it to his or her partner. Using their analysis, if WTA=WTP, we would 
expect on average about 1 3  trades. But, only six trades occurred, suggesting that WTA>WTP in this 
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2. Does WTA exceed WTP for rights to future cash flows,
such as securities? 
There is very little evidence on this issue, but what there is suggests that WT A=WTP for the 
simplest form of security -- the right to a certain cash payment. But for more complex securities, 
such as the right to the outcome of a fairly simple gamble or the purchase of insurance, WT A may 
exceed WTP. 
Knetsch, Thaler, and Kahneman conducted some experiments in which a security 
representing the right to an immediate and certain cash payment was traded.42 These experiments
took place in both an organized market and in a two-person, Coasian bargaining setting. In both 
forms the evidence strongly suggested that WT A=WTP. 
In the market experiments Knetsch, Thaler and Kahneman distributed 3 x 5 cards to subjects, 
who were given the following instructions:43 
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In this market the objects being traded are tokens 
(3 x 5 cards). You are an owner, so you now own a 
token, [You are a buyer, so you have an 
opportunity to buy a token] which has a value to 
you of $x. It has this value to you because the 
experimenter will give you this much money for it. 
The value of the token is different for different 
individuals. A price for the tokens will be 
determined later. For each of the prices listed 
below, please indicate whether you prefer to: 
( I )  Sell your token at this price, and receive the 
market price. [Buy a token at this price and cash it 
in for the sum of money indicated above.] 
(2) Keep your token and cash it in for the sum of 
money indicated above. [Not buy a token at this 
price.] 
For each price indicate your decision by marking 
an X in the appropriate column. 
At a price of $Y I will sell [buy] I will not 
sell [buy] __ 
--
The redemption values for the 3 x 5 cards produced one set of supply and demand curves, and the 
subjects' responses produced a second set of curves. The subjects were truthfully told that the 
priee in the experimental-market would be-set by the-intersection of the supply and demand curves 
produced by their responses, and that all offers to sell [buy] 3 x 5 cards below [above] that price 
would be executed. Knetsch, Thaler and Kahneman were able to compute the expected price and 
quantity traded in the experimental market, on the assumption that WTA=WTP, from the supply 
and demand curves produced by the redemption values. The experimenters then compared the 
expected price and quantity to the observed price and quantity, and found that they were so close 
that the hypothesis that WT A=WTP could not be rejected. 
The Coasian bargaining experiments proceeded somewhat differently. Subjects were 
designated as either buyers or sellers, and were given personalized redemption values for the 
coupons distributed by the experimenters. The subjects were placed into 39 pairs -- one buyer and 
one seller per pair -- and a coupon was distributed to each seller. All sellers had redemption 
values of $ 1 .50, while buyers had redemption values of either $2.00 or $4.00. Applying their 
previous argument, if WTA=WTP, we would expect all 39 coupons to be sold. However, if 
WTA>WTP by a significant amount, sales volume would be lower, as some sellers would value their 
coupons at more than the buyers would be willing to pay. They found that 38 out of 39 coupons 
were sold -- a result clearly consistent with WTA=WTP. 
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Knez, Smith, and Williams ran experiments that suggest that hypothetical WTA may exceed 
hypothetical WTP for relatively simple securities.44 They ran three sets of experiments, each
consisting of several independent trading periods for a security that paid $.50 with probability 50% 
and $2.00 with probability 50%. Hence, the expected value of this security was $1 .25. They gave 
each of the nine subjects in each experiment some securities and some cash. Before trading began 
in each period, the experimenters asked each subject to state his or her WTP and WT A for such a 
security. Trading then proceeded, securities changed hands, and the holders of the securities were 
paid their dividends. 
They found that at the beginning of each experiment individual subjects typically stated a 
higher WTA price than WTP price. However, the actual trading price was always less than or equal 
to the WT A price and greater than or equal to the WTP price. This suggests that subjects may state 
different buying and selling prices, but are willing to actually trade at a compromise price. 
Moreover, there was a tendency for WTA and WTP to converge as each experiment progressed. 
This suggests that repeated experience with the markets caused the subjects to reevaluate their 
responses so as to bring both WTP and WT A closer to actual trading prices. 
McClelland, Schulze, and Coursey45 conducted a series of experiments in which subjects could
" . . .  either submit bids to buy (WTP) or offers to sell (WT A) either a lottery ticket ( 40% chance of 
winning $10--a gain) or an insurance policy (against a 40% chance of losing $10--a 'loss')."46 In 
the WTP loss experiments subjects were given $25 up front and then participated in a fifth-price 
auction for the insurance policy. The four highest bidders purchased the policy for the fifth­
highest bid price. After the auction, a chip was drawn from an urn containing 40% red chips and 
60% white chips. If a red chip was drawn, those who did not purchase the insurance policy 
sustained the loss. 
In the WTA loss experiment each subject was endowed with $25 and the insurance policy 
described above and was asked to submit a bid for what he or she would be willing to accept to sell 
that policy. The market price to sell the policy was also determined by a fifth-price auction in 
which the four lowest offers sold the policy for the fifth lowest price. Those who sold their policies 
then sustained the loss if a red chip was drawn. 
The gain experiments were symmetric. In the WTP gain experiments subjects started with $25 
and submitted bids for lottery tickets for a 40% chance to win a $10 prize. The tickets were sold in 
a fifth price auction. Those who purchased the tickets then won $10 if a red chip was drawn from 
the urn. In the WTA gain experiments subjects were endowed with $25 and lottery tickets, and 
four tickets were sold back in a fifth price auction. 
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McClelland, Schulze, and Coursey find that in three of the four experimental treatments 
(WT A and WTP gain and WTP loss) both the mean and mode of individual bids or offers is only 
marginally above the expected value of $4. Moreover, between 60% and 80% of all such bids are 
about $5. However, in the WTA loss treatment there is a bi-modal distribution with a fat tail on the 
high end. The two modes are at about $5 and $10, with substantial secondary modes at about 
$12.50, $15, $20, and even $30. In other words, many subjects in the WTA loss experiments are 
essentially signalling either that they will only sell for the full value of the loss, if it occurs, or that 
they will not sell at any price. In the other three experimental treatments subjects quickly learn the 
expected value of the insurance policy or lottery ticket. In a separate paper, McClelland and 
Schulze47 offer an explanation for these results, which we find quite underdeveloped.48 
summarized above, is mixed. Knez, Smith, and Williams'49 results suggest that subjects learn over 
time to bring WTA=WTP, even when faced with risk. However, McClelland, Schulze, and 
Coursey's50 results suggest that WTA> WTP for risky monetary assets under certain special
circumstances, even after learning. 
3 .  Does repeated participation in a market reduce the 
spread between WT A and WTP? 
We have already reviewed all of the studies dealing with this question. Knetsch, Thaler, and 
Kahneman found no trend towards WTA=WTP in their four-period experiments, but Coursey, 
Hovis and Schulze; and Knez, Smith, and Williams did find such a trend in their multi-period 
experiments. Moreover, McClelland, Schulze, and Coursey found that WTA=WTP when bidding for 
a lottery ticket, but WTA>WTP when bidding for insurance against a loss. Thus, this issue is 
unresolved and may depend on particular circumstances and contexts. 
4. By what factor does WT A exceed WTP?
We have already reviewed most of the evidence on this question, and the answers we have 
observed range from Coursey, Hovis and Schulze's conclusion that WTA exceeds WTP by a very 
small amount, to the survey data that finds ratios of four to one, and sometimes even higher ratios. 
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5. Unhelpful Experimental Designs
Brookshire and Coursey51  conducted two surveys and one experiment designed to test whether
WTA>WTP for adding more trees to a new park located in the City of Fort Collins, Colorado. 
They contacted homeowners surrounding the site of the new park and showed the homeowners an 
artist's rendition of how the park would look with different numbers of trees. Those homeowners 
who were asked about their willingness to pay were shown pictures of the park with 200, 225, and 
250 trees. Those who were queried about willingness to accept compensation saw pictures of the 
park with 200, 1 75, and 1 50 trees. 
The WT A survey first showed the pictures to the homeowners and then asked the subjects 
"What minimum dollar amount would your household be willing to accept to decrease the base plan 
to 175  trees under this one time payment?" Brookshire and Coursey repeated the question, but 
with a decrease to 150 trees. The WTP subjects were asked "What maximum dollar amount would 
your household be willing to contribute to a fund to increase the base plan from 200 to 225 trees 
under this one time payment?" The question was then repeated, but with an increase to 250 trees. 
These questions were hypothetical, in the sense that no money was actually collected or paid, and 
the park's tree density did not depend on the homeowners' answers. 
The second type of hypothetical survey utilized a "Smith auction." The Smith auction begins 
by telling a group of people, in this case the homeowners, that they are participating in a group 
decision. Every homeowner surveyed (in the WTP version) was asked to submit an offer to pay for 
expanding the number of trees in the park to 225 or 250, and was told that all other homeowners 
being surveyed were also being queried. Brookshire and Coursey continue:52
The interview team explained that there were three 
possible outcomes depending on the sum of the 
payments from the households. First, if the sum of 
the payments was less than the cost of the 
additional trees, the base plan [200 trees] would not 
be expanded and the household would pay nothing. 
Second, if the sum of the payments equaled the cost 
of the additional trees, the base plan would be 
expanded and the household would pay exactly the 
amount it had offered. Third, if the sum of the 
payments was greater than the cost of the additional 
trees, the base plan would also be expanded. 
However, the household would not have to pay the 
full amount it offered. The offers in this case 
would be proportionally scaled back so that their 
sum exactly equaled the cost of the trees. 
Numerical examples of all three cases were 
provided to the respondent. 
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After explaining the three possibilities to the homeowners, Brookshire and Coursey told them 
the cost of increasing the number of trees from 200 to 225 and asked "What maximum dollar 
amount would your household be willing to contribute to a fund to implement this expansion?" 53 
Brookshire and Coursey then told the homeowners how much it would cost to increase the number 
of trees to 250 and asked the WTP question again. 
To gather data about WT A Brookshire and Coursey did essentially the same thing, except that 
homeowners were told how much money would be saved by decreasing the number of trees to 175 
or 1 50, and then were asked what was the minimum payment they would require to agree to the 
reduction. There were three analogous possible outcomes: the sum of the payments sought could 
exceed the cost savings, in which case there would be no reduction in the number of trees; the sum 
of the payments sought could exactly equal the cost savings, in which event the number of trees 
would be reduced and the homeowners would be paid their requested amounts; or the sum of the 
payments sought could be less than the cost savings, in which case the number of trees would be 
reduced and each homeowner would get more than his requested compensation. The responses from 
this survey, like the responses from Brookshire and Coursey's first survey, were hypothetical. No 
one actually paid or received money, and the number of trees in the park was unaffected by the 
homeowners' responses. 
Last, Brookshire and Coursey ran an experimental test of the possible divergence between 
WT A and WTP in which they implemented a Smith auction, similar to the one described above, 
except that the consequences of subjects' responses were real, not hypothetical. Participants in the 
WTP experiments were asked to submit bids indicating the maximum they were willing to pay for 
increases in the number of trees. If the sum of the bids was greater than or equal to the cost of 
increasing the number of trees, the experiment stopped and the cost of increasing the number of 
trees was collected from the participants. If the sum of the bids was less than the cost of increasing 
the number of trees, participants were asked to submit new bids. The bidding process was repeated 
up to 5 times if the cost was not covered at first. If, at the end of the fifth trial, the bids still 
totalled less than the cost of increasing the number of trees, the experimenters terminated the 
experiment, collected no money, and implemented no increase in the number of trees. Participants 
in the W TA experiments were asked to indicate the minimum amount they would have to be 
compensated to accept decreases in the number of trees. If, by the fifth trial, the requests totalled 
less than or equal to the cost savings from reducing the number of trees, the experimenters paid the 
homeowners for the reduction. In all, " ... $1500 was ultimately contributed to the city of Fort 
Collins' Parks and Recreation Department for use in purchasing trees for Troutman Park."54 
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However, there was no guarantee that the funds would be used to change the number of trees in 
the park. 
Brookshire and Coursey found that WT A greatly exceed WTP in the first and second surveys. 
In the first survey the WT A/WTP ratio exceeded 60/ I for increments of 25 trees, and approached
90/ I for increments of 50 trees. The second (Smith auction) survey produced even more extreme
results; WTA exceeded WTP by vast margins. The experiment produced WT A values that were 
closer to, but still greater than, WTP. There was some tendency for the disparity to narrow by the 
final round for the 25 tree increments. 
Do the Brookshire and Coursey experiments provide solid evidence of the relationship 
between WT A and WTP? Unfortunately, they do not, because the structure of their surveys and 
experiment compared different things for purposes of comparing WT A and WTP. The WT A 
measures were computed on the homeowners' willingness to accept only 1 75 or 1 50 trees in the 
park, while the WTP measures were for increases to 225 or 250 trees. The central question in this 
paper is whether WTA>WTP for the same good. To see why Brookshire and Coursey's experiment 
may be defective, consider a hypothetical homeowner who values trees in the park according to the 
following schedule: 













Moreover, WTA=WTP for all of these values. The Brookshire and Coursey methodology, however, 
would determine that this homeowner has a WTP = $25 for an increase of 25 trees over 200 and $45 
for a 50 tree increase, but has a WT A of $500 for a 25 tree decrease below 200 and $ 1 ,500 for a 50 
tree reduction. Thus, they are measuring a disparity between WT A and WTP for different 
commodities. For that reason, this experiment can only be taken as suggestive of some difference 
between WTA and WTP, because its results may be quite consistent with WTA=WTP. Because of 
the ambiguity in interpreting the Brookshire and Coursey experiment, we will not discuss it in the 
other sections of this paper. However, despite the ambiguity in interpreting Brookshire and 
Coursey's results, the general results summarized above suggest the possibility that WTA> WTP for 
some kinds of goods (or bads). 
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Knetsch and Sinden55  conducted experiments involving lotteries in consumer goods. In one
experiment they gave lottery tickets to 76 subjects and offered one half of the subjects the 
opportunity to sell the tickets back to the experimenter for $2, while the others were required to 
pay $2 to keep their tickets. Subjects knew that the winner of the lottery would get "either $70 
worth of merchandise vouchers redeemable at a local variety store or, at the choice of the winner, 
$50 in cash."56 They claim that, if WTA=WTP and if wealth effects are so small as to be negligible,
we would expect about the same number of people to pay $2 to keep the ticket as decided to sell 
the lottery ticket for $2. If WTA>WTP, however, fewer should sell the lottery ticket. Knetsch and 
Sinden observed that 1 9  of 38 subjects agreed to pay $2 for their lottery ticket, but only 9 of 38 
agreed to sell the ticket back. Knetsch and Sinden ran four other sets of experiments, similar in 
design to the one described above. In all but one of the experiments, the results suggested to 
Knetsch and Sinden that WTA>WTP. The exception was consistent with the hypothesis that 
WTA=WTP. 
They57 also ran an experiment that suggested to them a divergence between WTA and WTP for 
securities representing lotteries. They assembled 52 subjects and paired them off. One person in 
each pair received an envelope. The subjects were told that approximately one third of the 
envelopes contained $1,  one third $2, one third $5, and one envelope contained $20. The subjects 
were then allowed to sell their envelopes. Using their earlier argument, if WTP=WTA, we would 
______ ,,e,.xp.,eGt-about 13 sales to oeeur in the 26 pairs. Hewever, if WTA>WTP, l'le wemld-expect to see fat 
fewer than 1 3  trades. They observed only 5 trades. 
Their results may be suggestive of WTA>WTP, as they claim, but there is an equally plausible 
explanation consistent with WTA=WTP. Suppose, for example, that WTA=WTP for each individual, 
but the mean W TA=WTP is greater than $2.00. Figure 1 illustrates a normal distribution of 
WTA=WTP, with a mean of $4.00. Asked to indicate whether they are willing to buy at $2.00, more 
than half the participants respond positively, because more than half are willing to pay $2.00 or 
more. However, asked to indicate whether they are willing to sell at $2.00, less than half respond 
positively, because half are only willing to sell for $4.00 or more. Any distribution with a mean
greater than $2.00 will yield similar results. This experimental design could only conclusively show 
WTP>WTP if we knew the mean WTP was less than or equal to $2.00. 
[Figure I about here]
Knetsch and Sinden58 designed another experiment to measure the disparity between WT A and 
W TP. Unfortunately, it is subject to the same critique as their experiment described immediately 
above. In this experiment, each of 128 subjects was given a ticket to a lottery in which the winner 
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would be given $90 in bookstore vouchers or $70 in cash. One half of the subjects were required 
to pay to keep the tickets, while the others were offered cash to give the tickets back. The buyers 
were divided into four equally sized groups and were required to pay $1,  $2, $3, or $4 for the 
ticket. The sellers were also divided into four equally sized groups and were offered $1 ,  $2, $3, or 
$4 for the tickets. More subjects refused the compensation offer than agreed to pay for the tickets, 
supporting their earlier evidence. They also calculated an expected value for WT A and WTP from 
this data, by calculating the probability that an individual chosen at random would be willing to 
accept varying levels of payment, and by calculating the probability that a randomly chosen 
individual would be willing to pay various amounts of money. They then multiplied the 
probabilities times the amounts ($1 , $2, $3, $4) to get an expected value. They estimated that WTP 
= $ 1 .28 and WTA = $5.18.59 Thus, their evidence is consistent with the survey evidence that 
estimates W T  A is 4 to 5 times greater than WTP. 
This experiment suffers from the same problem as Knetch and Sinden's other work. If 
subjects' WTA (= WTP) valuations are normally distributed with mean greater than $2.50, Knetch 
and Sinden's design will erroneously conclude that WT A > WTP. The calculations of the size of the 
difference are also flawed. 
III. Explanations for the Evidence
In this section of the paper we review several explanations for the evidence presented above. 
One of the explanations has already been discussed and is based on a reinterpretation of the wealth 
effect. The other explanations fall into two groups. First, there are psychological theories 
representing alternatives to the mainstream economic assumption that individuals mentally convert 
all of their noncash holdings into cash and then choose, from all possible combinations of goods 
and services that they can afford, the one that maximizes their utility. All of these alternative 
explanations are more elaborate than the mainstream economic assumption, but their power is 
undercut by the need to categorize events, on an ad hoc basis, into separate psychological 
categories. In addition to a reinterpretation of wealth effects, we examine prospect theory, value 
(or preference) uncertainty, existence values, using a maximin choice rule for WT A for losses, the 
need to "close" transactions, and the "endowment effect." Second, we also consider the possibility 
that respondents e ither interpret WTA and WTP questions in fundamentally different ways or 
misrepresent their true preferences to experimenters. 
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A. Wealth Effects 
As discussed above in  conjunction with the work of Knetsch, Kahneman, and Thaler60, real
differences between WT A and WTP could be the result of a wealth effect associated with 
ownership, which is consistent with the value of the good owned. To reiterate, a person who can, 
for example, view the Grand Canyon without smog might very well be willing to pay more to 
preserve that unobstructed view than the same person who did not have such a view would be 
willing to pay, even though he or she would be willing to pay the same amount under the same 
circumstances. 
Figure 2 illustrates how such an income effect could be quite large. Figure 2 shows a set of 
indifference curves for clean air and other goods for a representative consumer. The consumer has 
G1 of other goods to consume. If the consumer is endowed with relatively pristine air, he or she is 
at point B, consuming G1 other goods and enjoying A1 amount of clean air. However, if the 
consumer is endowed with relatively dirty air, he or she is at point C, on a lower indifference 
curve, still consuming G 1 other goods, but breathing A2. Asked to name the minimum he or she
would accept to move from A 1 to A2, the consumer endowed with pristine air would say G2 - G1•
With G2 in other goods, the "wealthier" consumer is able to remain on the same indifference curve 
(U 1) breathing dirtier air. However, if the same consumer were endowed with dirty air, be or she 
would say that G1 - G3 was the maximum he or she would be willing to pay to improve air quality
from A2 to A1 • With G3 other goods and clean air (A1), this "poorer" consumer is on the same 
indifference curve (U2) breathing cleaner air. Notice that WTA>WTP for a consumer whose
preferences accord with the standard economic model of consumer preference. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
The above point was made in  a recent article by Hanemann61 , who goes on to show that the 
difference between W T  A and WTP can get very large if income elasticity is positive and the 
elasticity of substitution between clean air and other goods is very small. In the limit, as 
" . . .  substitution elasticity goes to zero, the difference between WTP and WTA goes to infinity for 
any positive income elasticity."62 In other words, if the elasticity of substitution between clean air 
and other goods were zero, a person would be willing to pay nothing to obtain cleaner air but 
demand an infinite compensation to give it up. This happens because an individual with a zero 
elasticity of substitution is not willing to substitute one good for another if he or she is to stay on 
the same indifference curve. Thus, endowed with dirty air, he or she will sacrifice no amount of 
other goods to obtain cleaner air. Any sacrifice of other goods moves the consumer to a lower 
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indifference curve. In contrast, endowed with clean air, no amount of other goods will compensate 
for a deterioration in air quality. Any sacrifice of air quality moves the consumer to a lower 
indifference curve. 
Hanemann's point is illustrated in Figure 3. The assumption of zero elasticity of substitution is 
captured by the "square" indifference curves. A consumer endowed with relatively pristine air 
maximizes utility at point D, consuming G3 other goods and enjoying A3 amount of clean air.
However, a person endowed with relatively dirty air can only maximize utility at point E, 
consuming G4 other goods and breathing A4 clean air. Asked to state WTA for a reduction in air 
quality from A3 to A4, the consumer imagines himself or herself at point D and realizes that no 
amount of other goods can compensate for any reduction in air quality. On the other hand, asked to 
state WTP for a comparable increase in air qualtiy, the same consumer imagines himself or herself 
at point E and realizes that no improvement in air quality can compensate for a loss of goods. 
Comparing points D and F, holding goods fixed at G3, the consumer's W TP to move from A4 to A3
is G3 - G4 (putting the consumer at point H), but his or her WTA to move from A3 to A4 is 
infinite. 63 
[Figure 3 about here) 
Prospect theory was developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky to explain choice in 
risky situations.64 Kahneman and Tversky posit that individuals have a value function defined
with respect to the status quo.65 This value function has the shape p ictured in Figure 4, which 
indicates that the value of the status quo is zero, the value function for gains is positive and 
concave, and the value function for losses is negative, convex, and more steeply sloped than the 
value function for gains. 
[Figure 4 about here] 
This value function implies that a loss and a gain of equal size will not produce equal amounts of 
pain and pleasure; the loss will be felt more acutely.66 It also implies that a person will be risk 
averse over gains and risk seeking with respect to losses.67 Although the empirical research
underlying the development of prospect theory has been strongly criticized on a number of 
grounds, 68 we ask only whether it adds anything to explaining the disparity between WT A and 
WTP. 
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Prospect theory has been adapted, first by Thaler69, and then by Knetsch, Thaler, and 
K ahneman70 to explain why WTA>WTP. The match is not perfect, however, because prospect
theory was developed to explain the behavior of people facing risky choices about money, and the 
adaptation is about goods. The common theme, however, is that losses loom larger than gains. They 
argue that this theme can help explain why WT A would exceed WTP. If someone already owns a 
good and is offered money to part with it, he regards the potential sale as the loss of the good. If 
he does not own the good, however, and is considering purchasing it, he will view the potential 
purchase as a gain of the good. Because losses loom larger than gains, the individual will demand 
more to part with a good he already owns than he will be willing to offer for the same good. In 
other words, WTA>WTP. 
Richard Thaler has also adapted prospect theory, suggesting that WTA exceeds WTP because 
of the difference between received income and opportunity cost. In order to buy a good an 
individual must use out-of-pocket money (termed "received income"). To keep a good already 
owned, an individual must spend money he or she would have received had the good been sold 
(termed "opportunity cost").71 Thaler claims that people weight received income more than
opportunity costs, and that this difference in weighting causes people to spend opportunity costs 
more freely. Thus, a person would be willing to pay more in opportunity cost to keep a good he 
already possesses than he would be willing to spend in received income to acquire the good. As a 
consequence, WTA>WTP. Thaler refers "to the underweighing of opportunity costs as the 
endowment effect."72 The causes of the endowment effect, however, escape explanation or
exploration. In essence, the endowment effect is identical to prospect theory's value function, and 
needs some additional explanation to be useful. Hence, without more work, the endowment effect 
fails as an explanation for WTA > WTP. 
The adaptation of prospect theory's value function to explain WT A > WTP is no more than an 
elaborate w ay of saying that the same general theory of value has power at predicting both the 
disparity between WTA and WTP and choices made in other (often risky) situations. But the 
principle that losses loom larger than gains is itself unexplained. And it is very close to simply 
saying, "WT A is greater than WTP." A deeper explanation would center on psychological needs, or 
perhaps sociobiological advantages of acting in accord with prospect theory. For example, a 
sociobiological theory would center on possible survival advantages of treating gains and losses 
differently. Perhaps when humans were hunter-gatherers, living at the edge of survival, 
significant losses of any sort raised the threat of death and the attendant failure to transmit one's 
genes to the next generation. Gains, on the other hand, might have produced no symmetrically 
greater chance of transmitting genes. Hence, from a genetic standpoint, perhaps losses "hurt" more 
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than gains of equivalent size. 73 This would explain why humans might evolve so that their decision
processes reflect a value function that is steeper for losses than for gains. 
We could also reconstruct prospect theory and the endowment effect as a new explanation of 
WTA > WTP by relying on Margaret Radin's adaptation of Hegel's theory of property.74 Radin 
posits that some property becomes bound up with the individual's personality to such an extent that 
the person regards the property as part of his personhood. Examples of such goods include one's 
wedding ring, favorite clothes, paintings and other decorations in the house, and, perhaps, the 
house, itself. Before a good is purchased it has no such status; it is merely a fungible marketplace 
commodity. But after the good is acquired it can gain such status. 
Radin's observation can help explain why WT A exceeds WTP. If Ronald is going to buy a hat 
in the marketplace he will regard hats as fungible commodities. He will be willing to pay up to 
some maximum amount, WTP. On the other hand, if Ronald already owns a hat he will regard it as 
an expression of his personality, as a part of him. When someone tries to buy that hat from 
Ronald, he will view parting with the hat as parting with some of himself, and demand more 
money, WTA, to do so. Hence, WTA>WTP. 
Radin's theory of property and personhood might help explain the results involving coffee 
tnugs, pens, and perhaps the 1ight not ta tas-te--SOft .. , but it c:ioe: cimen..,_ ____ _ 
observed a difference between WT A and WTP for securities representing only the rights to cash 
flows. And for Radin's theory to explain the coffee mugs, pens, and SOA experiments, the 
integration of marketplace goods into personality must take place very quickly, for in Knetsch, 
Thaler, and Kahneman's experiments the subjects had ownership of the goods for only a few 
minutes before they were asked to reveal WT A and WTP. 75 
Other, more complex explanations, would be required to fuIIy explain the shape of the value 
function in prospect theory. These explanations would be very useful in understanding empirical 
data and assessing its normative impact. However, until someone proffers a reasonably rich set of 
underlying explanations for prospect theory as it applies to the disparity between WTA and WTP, 
prospect theory will remain a primitive explanation. 
Prospect theory also has another major problem: in many circumstances it is not clear whether 
a change in ownership is a gain or a loss.76 For example, assume that a grandmother tells her 
devoted granddaughter that when the grandmother dies she will leave her necklace to the 
granddaughter. Should the necklace be regarded as "owned" by the granddaughter, so that if 
someone offers, while grandmother is still alive, to pay the granddaughter cash immediately in 
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exchange for the necklace when the grandmother dies, the granddaughter will demand W T  A? Or is 
the necklace as yet unacquired, so that the granddaughter will take less? The answer is by no 
means clear. Or, for a second example, assume that a person enters into a contract to buy a car at a 
good price from a dealership, delivery to be made in one month. Before delivery is made the 
dealer goes bankrupt and the contract is cancelled. Will the car buyer regard the car as a loss, or as 
a foregone gain? We cannot know from prospect theory. 
Applying prospect theory to exchanges of goods for money presents another similar problem. 
Since the purchase of a good represents a loss of money and the sale of a good represents a gain of 
money, it is not clear what are gains and what are losses. If prospect theory applies particularly to 
money, then selling a good is a gain and buying a good is a loss. It seems that prospect theory could 
be adapted quite conveniently to explain any observed divergence between WT A and WTP. 
In sum, prospect theory provides little help, at the present time, in understanding why 
W T  A> WTP. First, we have no general explanation of why the value function is shaped as it is. 
Second, on a more practical level, prospect theory cannot help us either sort losses and foregone 
gains or even identify losses and gains. And until we can confidently characterize such situations, 
prospect theory's power will be limited. Until that time, we must rely on intuition, perhaps 
derived from introspection, to produce these characterizations. 
C. Closing Transactions 
Mark Kelman has suggested that people view an exchange as a psychological unit, and that 
there is a need to complete these psychological units by finishing transactions.77 This is most 
obvious, he says, as a way to explain why people do not ignore sunk costs. Kelman uses an 
example of someone who has paid $ 100 to join a tennis club, develops a bad elbow, and continues 
to play through the pain, even though he would not play tennis if he had not paid $ 1 00 and tennis 
were available at no charge. This consumer is acting irrationally, according to traditional utility 
theory, because the $ 100 is a sunk cost, gone forever and irrelevant to any new decision. However, 
Kelman says, the consumer's behavior can be explained by the need to "close" transactions. 
"Consumers try to 'close' transactions: $100 was spent on tennis, and the consumer wants $100 of 
tennis value."78
The need to close transactions can also help to explain why WTA exceeds WTP, Kelman 
claims. Once a person has acquired a good he has closed the transaction. When a buyer offers to 
buy the good the person must consider reopening the old transaction. The psychological need to 
close transactions, however, militates against this. Only if the person receives a large price for sale 
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of the good will the psychic cost of reopening an old transaction be compensated. In contrast, 
when the same person is considering buying the same good, no transaction yet exists, and hence 
there are no psychic costs associated with making an offer for the good. As a result, Kelman says, 
WTA>WTP. 
Kelman's theory provides a good start at explaining some, but not all, of the results. The 
theory has most power at explaining results involving consumer items, such as coffee mugs or pens, 
where consumers habitually purchase the item, consume it, and do not resell it. The theory would 
seem to have less to say about securities, which are aquired only for the instrumental purpose of 
making money, possibly by reselling the security if that seems most profitable. But even in the 
case of consumer items, Kelman's theory applies to experimental settings only if the experimental 
gifts of coffee mugs and pens count as closed transactions. 
Outside of the experimental setting Kelman's theory suffers from similar difficulties. To use 
Kelman's theory we need a definition of "transaction," together with a way to recognize whether 
the transaction is closed or open. For example, assume that Ronald offers to  buy a hat from 
George for $10, and George says that he will "think it over." Under contract law it is clear that no 
agreement has been formed, but this does not tell us whether or not Ronald has entered a 
psychol ogical transaction. If Ronald has entered into a psychological transaction he may have a 
---------<ll>te,.,ed-t-0 close it U-so-,----a£ter a day or two it wi11 be worth his while to offer more money ta close 
the deal. Otherwise, not. Even if we somehow knew whether or not Ronald has entered a 
"transaction" we would need to know how to  recognize closed or open transactions. For example, if 
George agrees to sell Ronald the hat can the transaction then be considered closed, or do we need 
to wait until George delivers the hat, or perhaps until Ronald inspects the hat for defects and 
satisfies himself that there are none? For present purposes, Kelman's closing transaction theory 
works by using intuitive answers to  all of these questions. 
D. Value (or Preference) Uncertainty 
Heiner79 prop osed a theory which has implications for understanding the disparity between
WT A and WTP. He suggested that if preferences are uncertain, information is unreliable, or an 
individual's ability to  process information is unpredictable, economic agents tend to  develop 
behavioral rules of thumb and institutions, which generate predictable economic outcomes, despite 
the underlying uncertainty. Sometimes these predictable economic outcomes appear to be the result 
of agents behaving "as if'' they are making maximizing decisions and s ometimes they do not. One of 
the non-maximizing outcomes on which he focusses is discussed in the literature by Arrow80 and 
Kunreuther, et. at.,81 and studied experimentally by McClelland, Schulze, and Coursey.82 In this 
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well-documented choice anomaly, people will insure against relatively high probability hazards at 
actuarially fair prices, but will either not insure against very low probability hazards even at 
extremely favorable prices or pay more than an actuarially fair price. In the field, people have to 
be subsidized to buy flood insurance in places where floods are relatively rare. In the laboratory, 
McClelland, Schulze, and Coursey found mean bids for insurance generally equal to the expected 
value of the loss for loss probabilities between .2 and .9. At a loss probability of .0 1
, 
however, 25% 
of the subjects bid zero and almost as many bid twice the expected value. 
Bishop, Heberlein and Kealy83 suggest a way in which preference uncertainty might lead to a
divergence between WT A and WTP. They claim that when people are asked about WT A, they state 
amounts that are very high so as to "play it safe." By stating a high WT A, respondents are choosing 
an amount "at which they are relatively certain they really would sell."84 However, this theory also 
fails to explain the persistence of WTA>WTP in a market setting, because it contains no 
explanation of how the uncertainty is resolved when a genuine final offer is tendered. Unless this 
mechanism resolves uncertainty differently for buying and selling, the theory cannot explain the 
experimental results. 
E .  Explanations Suggesting True WT A Equals WTP: 
1 .  Misrepresentation 
One possibility, suggested by Knetsch, Thaler, and Kahneman85 is that individuals habitually
misstate WTA as greater than WTP because they are rewarded for doing so in many contexts, and 
that these habits carry over into contexts where there are no such rewards. If this explanation has 
some power, we should observe WTA moving closer to WTP in a market setting. Once the subject is 
confronted with a genuine final offer in a real market, there are no longer any gains from 
misrepresentation. 86 
As discussed above, 87 the evidence on convergence in a market setting is mixed. Coursey,
Hovis, and Schulze88 and Knez, Smith, and Williams89 find that WT A and WTP do converge when 
the good in question is the right to avoid tasting SOA or a security, respectively. However, 
Knetsch, Thaler, and Kahneman 90 come to the opposite conclusion for small consumer goods. 
McClelland, Schulze, and Coursey91 find that WTA converges quickly to W TP for uncertain gains,
but does not converge at all for uncertain losses. Boyce, et. al.92 find that W T  A converges "close" to 
WTP for a Norfolk Island pine which will not be destroyed, but does not converge at all for a pine 
which will be destroyed if sold or not purchased. 
30 
2. Experimenters Frame Questions Incorrectly
In hypothetical surveys, respondents might interpret WTP and WT A questions as legitimately 
asking for different responses. For example, suppose an individual has a normal downward-sloping 
demand for a good, as shown in Figure 5. When asked for willingness to pay, the individual thinks 
of some number of units being sold and responds with the lower, shaded rectangle. This is the 
amount he or she would have to pay to obtain the good in a competitive market. When asked for 
willingness to accept compensation, on the other hand, the individual responds with the entire 
consumer's surplus over those units ( the area under the demand curve). This total includes the 
shaded rectangle and the cross-hatched upper triangle. While this area also represents the true 
maximum willingness to pay, the individual either does not interpret the WTP question as asking 
for consumer's surplus or does not want to reveal the maximum willingness to pay to a surveyor. 
[Figure 5 about here] 
While this explanation may help to understand why survey responses to WTP and WT A 
questions are sometimes different, it also has problems for understanding how to interpret those 
differences. First, in many surveys it is not clear in what units a good is denominated. The 
surveyo1 may think-the individual is being asked for W'l"I\ and WTP over one unit while the 
individual may interpret in terms of multiple units. If each individual assumes a different number 
of units, there is no comparability across respondents. Second, it does not explain why subjects 
lowered WTA over the course of Coursey, Hovis, and Schulze's93 auctions or why they gave
WTA=WTP in McClelland, Schulze, and Coursey's94 WT A/gain auctions. Why would they interpret
the questions differently in one kind of WT A experiment and the same in another? Also, it fails to 
explain those experiments in which there were many fewer transactions than we would have 
anticipated. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS
We will discuss two different types of implications from the WTA, WTP experiments. First, 
the positive implications center on differences in observed behavior.95 The differential between
WT A and WTP may suggest that both Coasian bargaining and organized markets may work 
differently than previously thought. Second, the normative implications are those dealing with 
which options policy makers think society ought to choose. 
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A. Positive implications 
1 .  The Coase Theorem 
Jn two-person bargaining situations, WTA exceeding WTP would tend to reduce the number 
of voluntary trades. In particular, if two parties are bargaining over a right, and if each party's 
WTA is greater than the other party's WTP, no trades can take place. In such circumstances, a 
buyer would be unable to offer enough money to persuade the owner to part with the right. For 
example, assume that George owned a hat and Ronald wanted to buy it. George's WTA=$1 5, but 
his WTP=$1 0. Ronald's WTP=$1 1  and his WTA=$16.  Ronald would offer at most $ 1 1 while 
George would accept no less than $15,  and no trade would occur. On the other hand, if Ronald 
owned the hat he would accept no less than $16, while George would offer no more than $10.  In 
such circumstances, the right to the hat is "sticky"; it stays wherever it is.96 
A profit-maximizing entrepreneur might change the preceding scenario significantly, 
however. Assume that Geraldine knew of George and Ronald's WTA and WTP. If Ronald owned 
the hat she could do nothing to make money. But if George owned the hat, she could pay George 
$15,  allow Ronald to use the hat as if he owned it, and then later threaten to take the hat away. If 
allowing Ronald to use the hat we1e to raise his valuation of the hat f1on1 WTP to Vv'TA, and so111e 
of the explanations (particularly the version of the endowment effect suggested by Radin's work) 
suggest that it would, Geraldine could get up to $16  in exchange for the hat. In this way, 
Geraldine could make a profit and, regardless of who started with the legal right to the hat, Ronald 
would end up with it. Further, if George knew the same things that Geraldine knew and had the 
same entrepeneurial skills, he could execute Geraldine's strategy himself. Hence, the Coase 
Theorem's invariance result might be restored in this simple scenario. 
2. Markets
Recall that our simple model of organized markets involved supply and demand curves. The 
supply curve represented a graph of all the units that would be supplied in the market at each 
price. The demand curve represented a graph of all the units that would be demanded at each 
price. Consider the situation, depicted in Figure 6, in which two individuals, A and B, are 
exchanging units of a good for money. The vertical axis represents the unit price at which the good 
can be exchanged for money and the horizontal axis represents units of the good. QT represents the 
total amount of the good available for exchange. At 0 on the horizonal axis, person B owns all of 
the good. Transfers from B to A are represented by movements to the right along the horizontal 
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axis. At QT on the horizontal axis, person A owns all of the good. Transfers from A to B are
represented by movements from QT to the left along the horizontal axis. The baseline condition, in 
which WTA=WTP at every auantity for both A and B is represented by the curves WTP A=WTAA
and WTA8=WTP8• The graph is set up with A as the buyer and B as the seller, but since WTP=WTA 
for each person the roles could be reversed without changing the outcome.97 The outcome,
regardless of who owns the good to begin with, will be that A will end up with QA units and B will
end up with Q8 units. The price for the units exchanged, regardless of who is buying and who is 
selling, will be P 0•
[Figure 6 about here] 
Now, suppose that WTAA>WTPA and WTA8>WTP8• This situation is depicted in Figure 7. The 
dashed WTP lines represent the baseline case illustrated in Figure 6 and the solid WTA lines 
illustrate the effect of WTA>WTP. Viewing the graph from left to right, A is the buyer, with the 
dashed demand curve WTPA. B is the seller, with solid supply curve WTA8• Now the equilibrium
exchange finds B selling only QA'<QA units to A at a higher price (PA>P0) .  Similarly, if we view the 
graph from right to left, B is the buyer, with the dashed demand curve WTP8. A is the seller, with 
solid supply curve WTAA. Now the equilibrium exchange finds A selling only Q8'<Q8 to B at a
price of P8>P0• Thus A ends up with more of the good, relative to the baseline case, if he or she
-------<lO""'llI>S>-l1'0t�t0-begin witb,_Similarly, B ends up with more if be or she owns it to begin with. The final 
allocation of the good is not invariant to the initial distribution of rights. PA might be greater than, 
less than, or equal to P 8• But, both prices will be higher than P •' as long as demand is downward
sloping (supply upward sloping) for both individuals. Thus, in general, fewer units are transferred 
at a higher price if WTA>WTP. These results -- higher prices with fewer units tranferred from 
owners -- were derived assuming that the buyer and seller were price takers. If they were price 
seekers in the full sense of that term, we might reinvent the George/Ronald/Geraldine scenario 
discussed above. But the price taking assumption seems appropriate for extending these results to 
markets. 
[Figure 7 about here] 
The above discussion involving only two individuals extends immediately to competitive 
markets, simply by thinking of the individual supply and demand curveJ as market supply and 
demand curves. We offer two caveats. First, in a market, the equilibrium price and quantity are 
determined by the WT A and WTP of the marginal market participants. Thus, in a competitive 
market, it is possible for some participants to have WTA>WTP without that affecting market prices 
or transactions. As long as a sufficiently large number of participants have WTA=WTP for prices 
and quantities in the vicinity of the equilibrium we might never observe any reluctance to trade 
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from market data. However, if the marginal participants exhibit a reluctance to trade, we could 
observe the situation depicted in Figure 7. Second, the analysis assumes that WT A > WTP on both 
sides of the market. In many markets for new consumer goods, however, this is probably wrong. 
Sellers are firms, with WTA = WTP (we presume), while buyers are individuals. Hence, we have 
only to deal with the firms' WTP (= WTA) curve, and the individuals' WTP curve. But in other
markets, such as the one for residential real estate, individuals are on both sides of the market in 
great numbers. In these markets the analysis applies.98 
There may also be many implications for the analysis of political "markets." A quickly 
growing segment of political science analyzes politics from a rational choice perspective. Voters, 
political representatives, bureaucrats and interest groups all maximize their own welfare, subject to 
institutional constraints.99 Virtually all of this work uses some form of expected utility theory as 
the basis for human motivation. If gains and losses are treated differently, at least by voters, in 
many situations, the implications for the analysis of politics could be tremendous. A recent article 
by Roger Noll and James Krier represents the first tentative steps in that direction, attempting to 
gain some purchase on the politics of risk regulation, when voters are presumed to care more about 
losses than gains. 100 Such an analysis could be extended to explain the particular political salience
of military base closings or factory closings (as opposed to failing to open military bases or 
factories), increases in the unemployment rate, and many other issues. 
B. Normative Implications 
In this section we will speculate on some more general normative implications of WT A > 
WTP, suggesting that they may be extremely important. 
I. Resolving Disputes About Rights and Damages 
The courts are often called upon to determine which side to a dispute has the legal right to 
engage in some particular activity. For example, if a homeowner were to sue a smelter for polluting 
the air, the court would have to determine whether the smelter had the right to pollute or the 
homeowner had the right to clean air before determining whether an injunction should be 
allowed101 or any damages paid.102
Calabresi and Melamed suggest that such disputes over rights should often be resolved by 
estimating the level of pollution which maximizes the net benefits and then assigning the rights so 
as to minimize the transactions costs associated with enforcing that level of pollution. Net social 
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benefits are estimated by subtracting the cost of reducing pollution from the benefits to the 
homeowner from reduced pollution. Net benefits are maximized when the marginal cost of further 
reductions in pollution exactly equal the marginal benefits. 103
What is generally left out of this analysis is the possibility that WTA>WTP. If WTA>WTP, 
which value should be used to determine the benefit to the homeowner of reducing pollution in 
order to determine which side should have the right? For example, consider a situation in which 
the dirtiness of air is classified in parts per million (ppm) of particulate pollution. The air is 
currently dirty ( 1 000 ppm) and the question is whether the smelter should be required to install 
scrubbers to reduce pollution to lOOppm and to compensate the homeowner for past pollution. 
Now, suppose the homeowner would require (WT A) $1000 to accept that reduction in air quality if 
the air started at I OOppm, but would only be willing to pay (WTP) $100 to effect that reduction in 
pollution if the air started out at I OOOppm. It will cost the smelter $500 to install the scrubbers.
If we accept the status-quo as determining which side has the right (the air is dirty, implying 
the smelter has the right to pollute) then the cost of reducing pollution is greater than the gain and 
the decision should be no scrubbers and no compensation. The net benefit from installing scrubbers 
is $-400. However, if the homeowner has the legal right to clean air, and if the legal right 
controls the choice of value, then the net benefit is $500 and scrubbers should be installed. 
Moreover, the homeowner has incurred real damages in excess of the cost of pollution control in 
the past. Which analysis is correct? Neither, without knowing the allocation of rights a priori. Yet, 
the determination of net benefits is often a part of the process of determining rights. Such an 
analysis is decidedly circular when WTA>WTP.104
This circularity proves troublesome for particular legal doctrines that rely on estimates of net 
benefits. For example, when accidents produce damages, tort law frequently allocates losses 
through use of the negligence rule. One version of the negligence rule asks whether or not a 
defendant could have taken cost-justified steps to avoid the accident. That is, the defendant is 
negligent, and hence must pay for the plaintiff's damages (sometimes including pain and 
suffering), if the defendant could have taken steps to avoid the accident such that the cost of 
prevention was less than the expected savings in accident costs.105
The negligence rule is a bit easier to understand with an example. We will use the famous 
case of Bolton v. Stone, 106 in which Bessie Stone was hit on the head by a cricket ball hit over the 
fence at a club across the street from her residence. The batsman's blow was quite unusual; only a 
few balls had ever been hit out of the park before. Ms. Stone sued the club, claiming that its 
failure to put up a higher fence was negligent. In effect, Ms. Stone claimed that the cost of putting 
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up a higher fence would have been less than the expected reduction in accident costs to those 
standing in their front yards across the street from the club. Because the club was negligent, Ms. 
Stone contended, the club should pay her medical expenses and other costs associated with her 
injury. Ms. Stone's claim required the court to compare the cost of putting up a higher fence with 
the reduction in expected accident costs by preventing the exit of the balls that would be caught by 
the higher fence. The potential disparity between WT A and WTP adds a crucial element of moral 
ambiguity into the court's negligence calculus. To see this, assume that it would cost $100 to put 
up a higher fence, that Ms. Stone would pay only $50 to be free of the cricket ball risk eliminated 
by the higher fence, but would demand $ 1 50 to agree to be subjected to that risk. If the court 
were to use the WTP values, the club would not be negligent, and Ms. Stone would have no claim 
against the cricket club. On the other hand, if the court were to use the WT A values, the court 
would find that the club could have avoided $ 1 50 of expected harm by spending only $100, clearly 
a cost-justified expenditure on accident avoidance. The club would be negligent and liable to 
Bessie Stone. The crucial question becomes: which figures should the court use? Unfortunately, 
there is no easy or obviously correct answer. 107
Jack Knetsch has suggested resolving the moral ambiguity by giving special status to the 
benefits enjoyed by people in the status quo.108 He says that if people are enjoying clean air,
water, access to sunshine, etc., that any net benefit assessment should use the WTA figures for 
-------!!!1>i¥"lH0 l"ll!!!!-UU1>P-<tnh.,.es,�enefits, regardless of whether or not-the-people truly have the legal right to these 
benefits. We should, he says, discount the value of the resources they are enjoying by the 
probability that they can continue to enjoy them. "The welfare associated with any set of 
expectations and entitlements will likely, all other things equal, reflect their security; more tenuous 
ones will be discounted relative to ones more certain of protection."109 Thus, if there is a chance 
that a court will not uphold the losers' legal rights to enjoy the resources they would lose, the value 
of enjoying those rights should be discounted. 
Knetsch's reference to "expectations and entitlements" injects ambiguity into the analysis. If 
we focus on "entitlements: then Knetsch's resolution of the problem is really the "property rights" 
solution, described above. Instead of just determining, by some method, whether or not the about­
to-be disappointed claimants really have a legal right to use the resources that may be withdrawn 
from them (and using the WT A value if they have a legal right, the WTP value if they do not) 
Knetsch would presumably compute the probabilities of the alternative legal outcomes, multiply 
the WTA and WTP values by their probabilities, and then sum to get the value of the rights. In 
essence, the correct value, for Knetsch, is grounded in whether or not the claimants have legal 
rights to the resources they currently enjoy, but discounted for risk. However, this has the same 
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basic problem that we noted above. If we must rely on who has the rights before we start the 
analysis, we inject circularity into the whole process. 
However, if we focus on "expectations," then Knetsch is saying something quite different. He 
is claiming that policy analysis and legal decisions ought to turn on values implied by individuals' 
true beliefs about the status quo, regardless of the legal rules.1 1 0  Such an approach might have
some promise, but will face several problems, both practical and normative. On the practical side, 
it may be difficult to get disputants to reveal their honest beliefs about the status quo when they 
know that their rights or wealth depend upon the answers. 1 1 1  In addition, we will often face 
situations involving conflicting, inconsistent beliefs about the status quo. Shall the analyst or judge 
prefer one or another of the beliefs, or construct some new, artificial belief out of those honestly 
held by the parties involved? If the analyst or judge is to choose the beliefs of one of the parties, 
he or she must do so on some basis other than the legal rights of the parties, lest we reinvent the 
circular arguments in the paragraphs above.1 1 2  This will require some moral theory about why we 
Q.!!&h1 to respect some view of the status quo. This moral theory might point to some view of the 
status quo not held by anyone, in effect requiring the analyst or jurist to construct a new, artificial 
belief. But this points out the inexorable link between the practical problems and the normative 
ones. Thinking about how to privilege some beliefs over others requires one to explain why we 
ought to pay attention to any beliefs about the status quo. If we have good reason for rejecting all 
-------,eliefs-about the status quo as unreawnable,-f_or example, we may not want to us�ose beliefs as 
the basis for a cost/benefit analysis that will support policy recommendations or judicial decisions. 
The disparity between WT A and WTP could also figure into other normative systems. In a 
recent working paper1 1 3, Knetsch and coauthor David Cohen suggest that the Aristotelian notion of 
corrective justice (often referred to as "fairness" in the working paper) depends on this disparity in 
valuation. Although the exact outline of their argument remains unclear to us after reading their 
paper, they emphasize that disruptions in our patterns of ownership or possession 1 14  produce losses 
that are deeply felt. Apparently, courts should neither allow private parties to impose such losses, 
nor impose them by judicial act. 
The Cohen and Knetsch effort deserves credit. They are trying to build upon this new body 
ofknowledge about valuation, and integrate this knowledge into a theory of how rights ought to be 
respected by the court.1 15 But they are still a long way from being finished. First, they are far 
from clear at explaining how the disparity between WTA and WTP fits into their argument. They 
must show that the disparity strengthens their justice argument to be something more than a thesis 
about protecting "rights,"1 1 6  without simultaneously leading back to efficiency analysis. As a part 
of this enterprise, Cohen and Knetsch must solve the same problems of identifying the morally 
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appropriate status quo. This task is approximately the same as that involved in identifying 
"reasonable" expectations about the status quo. Second, Cohen and Knetsch build an argument 
based upon the presumption that WTA > WTP everywhere, for everyone, and at all times. Thus, 
they "explain" and justify the law of adverse possession, 1 1 7  recovery of lost profits in tort and
contract, 1 18 contract modifications, 119 gratuitous promises, 120 opportunistic conduct in contractual
performance or negotiation, 121 and repossession, 122 with reference to the same disparity between
WTA and WTP. However, some of the parties are individuals, while others are corporations. And 
the subject matter of the disputes Cohen and Knetsch review range from the very personal (such as 
jewelry or furniture) to completely fungible (such as aluminum ore or money). The evidence 
reviewed above suggests that the disparity may vary widely between these cases. Consequently, 
Cohen and Knetsch's analysis should probably track the variations in the disparity, or else provide 
a good reason for failing to do so. 
A similar critique applies to the most prominent attacks upon cost benefit analysis. 
Duncan Kennedy and Mark Kelman made many of the arguments in the paragraphs above, 
based upon the presumption that WTA>WTP, and suggested that cost/benefit analysis lacks 
legitimacy. But their analysis rested upon a rather blunt notion that WTA>WTP, without any 
notion of the limitations of the evidence on that question. Moreover the legal articles that cite 
Kelman and Kenned) alse-adopt the same blunt prepesitien that WTA>'l/TP . 123
This brings us to the central normative insights of our paper. If the evidence were to show 
that WTA>WTP under all circumstances, then the Kelman/Kennedy critique of cost/benefit 
analysis, and Cohen and Knetsch's corrective justice argument, might represent the state of the art. 
But the evidence simultaneously suggests a far more complex pattern relating WT A to WTP, and 
leaves many of the details of this relationship unresolved. If we were to apply the evidence 
reviewed in this paper to the normative issues involving either assignments of legal rights or 
determinations of damages, we might produce some different conclusions by resolving some of the 
issues left unanswered by the experimental evidence. If it is ultimately shown that only consumers 
have WTA>WTP, then we need not worry about this source of changes in valuation in disputes 
between commercial firms.124 In addition, if it turns out that WTA=WTP for securities representing
rights to cash flows, then we need not worry about this source of changes in valuation in legal 
disputes about financial instruments. Resolving questions about whether or not repeated 
participation in markets causes WTA to equal WTP, about how long it takes for consumers to shift 
from WTP to WTA for newly acquired rights, about exactly why people have a WT A greater than 
their WTP, and so forth, could further help to define the circumstances in which we could use the 
cost/benefit definition of negligence in torts, in which an individual's valuation of his goods could 
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be the measure of damages, and in which the cost/benefit approach to the allocation of rights 
might be used with some confidence.125 Similarly, Cohen and Knetsch could use these guidelines
to retire and enhance their corrective justice theories. 
Of course, none of this shows that cost/benefit analysis is the appropriate mode of moral 
discourse for resolving any class of disputes. The critics of the various forms of cost/benefit 
analysis have launched some extremely powerful attacks upon that norm.126 Those who have 
already renounced cost/benefit analysis because of the other attacks will regard our suggestion - ­
that one should narrow the domain of cost/benefit analysis -- as irrelevant. After all, one can 
hardly narrow the use of a totally unused norm. But for those who still feel that cost/benefit 
analysis might have a use, the data reviewed in this article provide crucial, cautionary guidance. 
2. Government shaping of preferences
In the long run, different governmental policies can shape individuals' preferences. Public 
provision of interesting, effective, challenging schools may lead to a taste for better education in 
the next generation. Laws requiring that dog owners clean up after their pets may lead to a 
stronger preference for clean streets. Laws preventing people from selling babies or beating their 
spouses and chi Id ren_ma_)'_Shape our attitudes_towards_thd __ amil:lf._Th�isLcan_gQ_J)_n_imil:finilllJ,,_,_ ____ _ 
Economists have tended to ignore the interactions between laws and preferences. 127 In order
to make analysis tractable, economic analysis has taken individuals' preferences as given and then 
asked what laws and social institutions would serve those preferences. In fact, microeconomics 
texts explicitly state that economics is not worried about what are good or bad preferences. 
Instead, economic theory accepts people's preferences as they are and then asks how people behave 
when guided by these preferences.128 Economic analysis of law has been no exception to this
rule -- preferences have been treated as if they were fixed by other forces. 
The evidence of WTA>WTP may ultimately force economists to stop avoiding the interaction 
between policies and individuals' preferences. The disparity between WT A and WTP seems to arise 
very quickly, if the Knetsch, Thaler, and Kahneman results are to be believed. This result suggests 
that preferences might change rather quickly as a result of policy changes. And because the ratio of 
WT A to WTP ranges between 1 . 5  and 5, the disparity is too big to be ignored. For example, return 
to our hypothetical example of a homeowner and a smelter. If they are located next to one another, 
and the smelter's operations degrade the environment enjoyed by the homeowner, the law will be 
forced to decide (in our simplified example) whether or not the smelter's operations violate the 
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homeowner's right to a clean environment. If the homeowner has the right to a clean environment, 
his WTA = $ ! 000, but if he has no such right, his WTP = $ ! 00. When an economic analysis of this 
law is done, there will be no avoiding the fact that choosing the legal rule also chooses the 
homeowner's preferences. The economic analysis will have to confront the question of whether the 
homeowner ought to value the environment highly. At present an economist would not address 
such a question. Philosophers have already studied this topic, 129 and economists may have to 
become familiar with the discourse. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The experimental evidence clearly suggests that WT A !Ilfil'. exceed WTP by substantial 
amounts. Exactly when this will occur is not yet clear, nor are the explanations for this 
phenomenon. In market settings the WTA/WTP disparity tends to raise prices and reduce the 
number of profitable transactions. In a two-person bargaining setting, WTA>WTP is one reason 
why rights may be "sticky," in that they tend not to be traded once they are assigned. 
Despite the evidence summarized above, however, the verdict is still out on the extent of the 
difference between WTA and WTP. First, there are many instances in which consumers readily 
engage in trade· buying and sellinLQf used cars. flea markets, and garage sales. Consumers readily 
part with their older cars in trade for new or newer models, even when they might have gotten a 
better price from a private sale. Similarly, at flea markets and garage sales, consumers sell used 
clothing and housewares for far less then the cost of replacement. Second, the experimental 
evidence needs further, independent, replication before it will be fully convincing.130
If we finally conclude that WTA>WTP in specific circumstances, then the basic normative 
implications are reasonably clear: courts cannot always legitimately use the cost/benefit definition 
of negligence, nor always rely upon individuals' values as unproblematic measures of damages, nor 
always use cost/benefit analysis to assign rights. The Kelman and Kennedy critiques anticipated 
this much. But in some circumstances WTA might equal WTP, and under those circumstances 
courts might be able to utilize individual values and the various forms of cost/benefit analysis that 
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